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BOOK NOTES
EINSTEIN'S HAIR
JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONA: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (UNITED STATES) AND
PORTRAIT LAW (NETHERLANDS) BALANCED WITH FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
FREE TRADE PRINCIPLES. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996. xliii +
490.
Reviewed by Jonathan A. Franklin*
In an era of satellite television broadcasting and globally accessible
web sites, with more and more images, names, and voices of celebrities
and other individuals crossing borders and continents instantaneously,
this volume could not have come at a better time. Written by a Dutch
attorney, this book addresses the major issues in the areas of privacy,'
publicity,' passing off,3 and portrait rights.4 After exploring the roots of
rights of publicity and reviewing the current state of Dutch and U.S. law,
Pinckaers crafts a proposal for an internationally adoptable intellectual
property right in persona. This commercial edition of Pinckaers' doc-
toral thesis includes objective (Part I) and subjective (Part II) sections,
followed by an extended discussion of how the proposed property right
in persona could be integrated into disparate legal systems.
Pinckaers begins Part I by describing how nine legal systems deal
with publicity rights. He next summarizes and critiques the laws of the
United States and the Netherlands that protect publicity and portrait
rights. Part I is exhaustive in its exploration of the diverse rationales
behind the laws and legal systems of different countries.
Pinckaers describes the origin of the Dutch "portrait right" as an
early twentieth century creation that emerged from the sense that there
should be limits on the use of one's portrait. The Dutch portrait right is
* Reference Librarian, University of Michigan Law School. M.Libr., University of
Washington (1994); J.D., Stanford Law School (1993); B.A., Stanford University (1988).
1. A privacy interest is the "legal protection against unauthorized advertising or other
forms of commercial use of a person's picture." JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY
TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONA 4 (1996).
2. The right of publicity is "a commercial tort which protects against
(mis)appropriation of the commercial value of another's identity." Id. at 15.
3. Passing off refers to "[plassing off one's product as the product of another com-
petitor." Id. at 5 n. 16.
4. Portrait right means that if a "portrait is made on order by or on behalf of the person
portrayed, the author is not entitled to make it public without the consent of the person por-
trayed." Id. at 13 n.59.
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limited to depictions of the individual's face, and has been expanded to
cover both portraits ordered and not ordered by the individual.5
Pinckaers also covers other Dutch laws that protect name, voice, and
other indicia of persona. In assessing the Dutch portrait right and related
laws, Pinckaers finds it lacking in sufficient protection of celebrity indi-
cia beyond image and name rights.
In exploring the law of the United States, Pinckaers focuses on the
right of publicity, defined as the idea that "a man has a right in the pub-
licity value of his photograph."7 Since Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, the first U.S. case to recognize a financial interest in the right of
publicity, more than a quarter of the states have adopted a statutory right
of publicity! A quarter more of the states, however, still have the com-
mon law right of publicity leaving half the states without any right of
publicity. 9 In contrast to the narrow scope of Dutch law, Pinckaers cri-
tiques the tort based, economically oriented U.S. law because it requires
a proof of commercial damage. He believes that publicity should be
framed as a right, rather than a tort, and thereby should focus less on the
damages and more on the right to license or withhold use of indicia of
persona. Under Pinckaers' proposal, individuals without commercial
value in their persona could still have right of publicity claims..
In one of the most interesting sections, section 7, Pinckaers explores
various rationales for a right of publicity, and the historical basis for
distinguishing it from the right of privacy. He believes that everyone,
including both celebrities and those who are not famous, should have
autonomy in determining how his or her image, name, and other indicia
will be commercially used. Ideologically, Pinckaers feels that this pro-
tection should exist as a property right, because such a right is morally
correct as an extension of a fundamental belief in human dignity. He
also believes that such a right would permit "an efficient allocation and
use of valuable identities."'" However, Pinckaers would not protect the
depiction of body parts or other physical features that do not indicate the
identity of the person. 3 The right of privacy as a property right also re-
sults in the more frequent granting of injunctive relief in cases where the
5. See id. at132.
6. See id. at 129, 424.
7. Id. at 28 (citing Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953)). Haelan involved two rival chewing gum manufacturers who were arguing over ex-
clusive rights to use the image of a professional baseball player to promote their product. Id.
8. See PINCKAERS, supra note 1, at 28 n.45.
9. See id. at 28 n.44.
10. See id. at 279-80.
11. See id. at 426.
12. ld. at 425.
13. See id. at 269.
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plaintiff's right of publicity has been violated, as well as allowing trans-
ferability of persona rights.'
4
Pinckaers is strongly influenced by the work of Thomas McCarthy,
who was a member of his doctoral panel. Pinckaers adopts many of the
perspectives set forth in McCarthy's The Rights of Publicity and
Privacy." He notes that McCarthy's recent revisions have acknowledged
that "likely damage" should be sufficient to make a right of publicity
claim, in effect moving towards a more property-oriented analysis.
Pinckaers also addresses the Restaterment (Third) of Unfair Compe-
tition of 1995,6 in which McCarthy had an advisory role. Pinckaers
critiques the Restatement's failure to clarify the definition of commer-
cial use17 and its permissive tort based approach. His primary complaint
is that in publicity cases the court must use an ad hoc approach to de-
termine whether a First Amendment defense- should outweigh a
commercial use of a person's identity, inhibiting outcome predictability.
One of Pinckaers' central goals in proposing his right in persona is to
distinguish commercial from non-commercial publicity claims. He be-
lieves that all non-commercial claims should be dealt with under other
regimes, notably privacy laws. Although this distinction is quite useful
in limiting claims to exclusively commercial cases, there will always be
marginally commercial uses which will have to be evaluated on an ad
hoc basis.
Pinckaers further subdivides commercial publicity claims into three
categories: media, semi-media, and non-media. Media, such as televi-
sion, newspapers, and books, includes a "medium of expression through
which ideas and opinions are regularly disseminated or communi-
cated."'" Most other products are non-media products, such as toys,
toiletries, and clothes. Pinckaers makes a special exception for semi-
media products that express ideas, such as tee-shirts, buttons, and
bumper stickers. 9 Pinckaers limits the applicability of his right to com-
mercial non-media and commercial semi-media cases, believing that
along with non-commercial cases, media cases should invoke a right of
privacy claim as opposed to a right of publicity claim, thereby avoiding
most First Amendment issues.
14. See Peter Harvey, Publicity Right Remains a State-Law Phenomenon, NAT'L L.J.,
May 12, 1997 at C43 (citing Newcombe v. Accolade, B.C. 164847 (L.A. County Super. Ct.
filed Jan. 28, 1997).
15. THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (1987).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).
17. See PINCKAERS, supra note 1, at 236. The Restatement merely defines commercial
use as "use for purposes of trade" Id.
18. Id. at 340.
19. See id. at 344.
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Pinckaers does make some very limited commercial semi-media and
non-media exceptions for political speech, factual information, parody,
de minimis use, and exhaustion. These proposed exceptions are all nar-
rower than those that currently exist under U.S. law, particularly the
parody exception. Furthermore, given the absolute nature of Pinckaers'
proposed right, there may be cases where the First Amendment must be
invoked in commercial speech cases, particularly in cases where no
more than necessary is taken to make the parodic point.
Pinckaers further limits the applicability of his right in persona to
cases of identity, as opposed to performances that incidentally include
the performer's identity.' For example, it would protect the singer Ma-
donna's image, but not a recording of one of her concerts. In those
concerts that are not media products, much of the analysis hinges on
distinguishing performance rights,21 from identity rights. By eliminat-
ing non-copyrightable performances from the scope of the proposed
intellectual property right of persona, Pinckaers removes a substantial
number of the non-media First Amendment related cases. Pinckaers re-
jects the application of a performance right of publicity in cases of
imitation, instead preferring that plaintiffs rely on unfair competition or
passing off claims.
The benefit of the right proposed by Pinckaers is that it is tailored to
reflect his moral and economic assumptions. But within the narrowing
right that Pinckaers has constructed, there are still numerous complex
issues to resolve. For example, Pinckaers acknowledges that civil law
European jurisdictions could more easily adopt a non-assignable right
than a true intellectual property right with all the attendant economic
advantages. Second, the proposed right of persona may conflict with
First Amendment commercial speech doctrine.
One of the most important problems with Pinckaers' right, as de-
fined, is that it does not address the problem of distinguishing the
indicia of the character depicted from the indicia of the individual actor,
celebrity or other person. Distinguishing whether the attributes belong
to the character as opposed to the person playing the individual is easy
in those cases where a name is used without an image or voice. The
same is not true when, in the absence of an exact visual or aural like-
ness, the indicia might still evoke the attributes of the actor who played
the character in the eyes of the jury.
20. See id. at 403.
21. See id. at 390 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
22. See, e.g., Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
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The Wendt v. Host Int'123 case is an example of the type of problem
Pinckaers does not directly address. In this case, two actors, George
Wendt and John Ratzenberger, from the hit television series Cheers sued
a food services corporation that had licensed the Cheers name and char-
acters for use in a bar, but had not licensed the individual actors who
played those characters. The bar included anamatronic robots that, al-
though had different names but still roughly resembled the characters,
Norm and Cliff, played by the actors. The two actors sued the bar, rais-
ing a right of publicity claim. The case, which has been remanded to the
District Court, hinges on whether robots incorporate sufficient indicia of
the actors' personas that they can prevail in a right of publicity claim.
The indicia of an individual, such as an image, name, or voice, can
be inherently personal, whether depicting that individual or a look-alike
or sound-alike. However, in specific contexts, more general similarities,
such as general body-type or voice-type, may evoke the indicia of the
character portrayed and also the actor who played the role. In such
cases, Pinckaers' right would protect the individual, even when what is
really being evoked is a character in a television show or movie who
was played by the individual. Such a right could chill the licensing for
commercial non-media products in which the character is not easily
distinguished from the individual playing the character because it would
require licensing both the character and the individual.
Even in commercial non-media identity cases, there is an open
question as to whether individuals should be protected beyond false en-
dorsement cases. If an indicia of persona is used without any suggestion
of endorsement, the individual has not been injured. In such cases,
products should be free to draw on the shared popular culture. Many
scholars focus on the role of intellectual property law in the incentive to
create, but these laws are also intended to benefit the public. In the case
of the proposed persona right, the individual benefits from his or her
fame or notoriety without contributing popular culture icons to the pub-
lic domain in a commercial context.
Much of Pinckaers' persuasiveness comes from his narrowly drawn
right, which excludes media products, non-commercial uses, and per-
formances. Once the right is sufficiently limited, the property
framework suggested by Pinckaers makes sense because it permits more
frequent injunctive relief than the existing tort based system. However,
23. Wendt v. Host Int'l, 125 F3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997). This case can be distinguished
from the other cases in which actors are defending a right of publicity for a character they
played, because in this case the actors did not share the same name as the characters, no
other actors played the part, and the characters existed in no other widely distributed format.
Id.
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depending on how a court defines "commercial," this right could easily
lead to a world where fear of litigation inhibits advertisers from drawing
on popular culture to spread their messages. Such a limitation "impover-
ishes the public domain to the detriment of future creators and the pub-
lic at large." 4 Regardless of this potential problem, this work contributes
substantially to the literature by advocating a particular position and
reconciling it with a range of legal systems. Furthermore, it addresses
many subissues and alternate perspectives over the course of its almost
five hundred pages. It is exhaustive within its stated scope and skillfully
ties together a vast number of cases, statutes, and secondary sources.
The objective sections describing the law will quickly become outdated
as new cases are decided and legislatures redraft statutes, but the
author's opinions will remain a valid and potentially influential per-
spective for the foreseeable future.
24. White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(objecting to denial of rehearing in case in which Samsung was found to have appropriated
Vanna White's identity in a television advertisement by using a robot dressed in a wig, gown,
and jewelry reminiscent of her hair and dress).
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